The thousands of men confined during the War Between the States faced a terrible ordeal due to the inability of the captors of both sides to meet the logistical challenges of housing and feeding the men that the fortunes of the battlefield had placed in their hands. The terrible conditions that the men faced in the camps were not faced solely by the men on either side, as the camps maintained by both the Union and Confederacy were filled with men who faced a terrible challenge not only from hunger, but from exposure and diseases.

The camps on both sides varied greatly due to a variety of causes: The ability of the surrounding countryside to provide the necessary foodstuffs and other crucial supplies, the weather, the outbreak of epidemics of infectious diseases, and the skill and ability of the men who were assigned to administer the camps. The conditions in the camps varied widely, with some of the camps being reasonably decent places to be confined, while others were terrible places to be held in. Several camps developed particularly bad reputations due to the large numbers of prisoners who died in them: Camp Douglas, Rock Island Barracks, Elmira, and Fort Deleware in the North, and Libby Prison, Belle Isle, and Salisbury in the South. Of all the prisons in the South, the one that attracted the most attention was the prison at Andersonville, Georgia.

The prison at Andersonville, which was called Camp Sumter by the Confederate authorities, was established in February of 1864. It began accepting prisoners on February 17, 1864, mainly men transferred from Belle Isle, Virginia in order to ease the terrible overcrowding in the Confederate prisons around Richmond. Once Camp Sumter opened, Federal prisoners began to flow in at a rate of 400 a day. Originally intended to hold 10,000 men, the camp quickly swelled beyond its intended capacity. On February 20, 1864, a mere four days after the camp opened, Captain R. B. Winder, the camp's quartermaster, wired his superiors attempting to raise the needed food stocks for the incoming prisoners. It was only the beginning of a continuing problem which was to reach crisis proportions within the next few months.

By July 1864, the prison population reached its peak at 31,678 prisoners. By this time, the authorities at the prison were frantic in their efforts to obtain the necessary supplies and medicines to care for the prisoners. They were hamstrung in their efforts by lack of funds, an inability to impress labor and supplies from the local citizens, and the refusal or delay of their requests by higher Confederate authorities. The swelling of the prison population was exascerbated by the decision of Union General U. S. Grant to stop the prisoner exchange system which had been occurring for two years under the prisoner exchange cartel which had been negotiated between the two governments in 1862.

By October, Confederate authorities began to transfer the prisoners to other facitilities, in response to both the threat of Federal forces at Atlanta, and the inability to properly care for the legions of starving prisoners at Andersonville. From its July peak of 31,000, the prison population soon dwindled to a mere 10,000, and stayed at that level until the massive prisoner exchange that occured in March of 1865, at which time the camp was virtually emptied.

From the earliest days of Camp Sumter, the Northern press wrote grossly embellished articles about the cruelties being inflicted on the hapless captives which brought about a hue and cry across the land for vengeance and retribution. The man most responsible for the treatment of the Union prisoners held in the Confederacy was Brigadier General John Winder, the commander of all Confederate prisons east of the Mississippi. Indeed, through much of the short life of Camp Sumter, Winder's headquarter were located at Andersonville. In all likelyhood, Winder would have been tried and executed by the North had not he succumbed to a fatal heart attack in February of 1865. It then came to pass that the North was to take its vengenace on the man who held the command of the prisoner stockade at the Andersonville complex, Major Henry Wirz.

Major Wirz, a native of Switzerland, had practiced medicine in both Kentucky and Louisiana prior to the war, but enlisted as a Sergeant in the Fourth Louisiana Infantry. He served with this unit until he was seriously wounded in the right wrist at the Battle of Seven Pines. The wound was considered to be incurable, and was a continuous source of pain for Wirz until he died. After he recovered somewhat from his wound, he was promoted to the rank of Captain and assigned to the staff of General Winder. He commanded several different prison facilities in the Richmond area. In order to facilitate his treatment by European doctors, he was given a mission as a plenipotentiary of the Confederate government for a mission to Paris and Berlin. He returned from Europe in 1864, and was assigned to the command of the interior stockade of the Andersonville prison on March 27, 1864.

Wirz remained at Andersonville, except for a sick leave in August of 1864, until his arrest on May 7, 1865 at the prison by Captain H. E. Noyes, of General James H. Wilson's staff. He was transported to Washington, D. C., and there stood trial before a military tribunal on a variety of charges. His trial began on August 23, 1865, and continued until October 23, 1865, at which time he was convicted of virtually all of the charges and sentenced to hang. He was hanged on November 10, 1865 at Old Capitol Prison, and he was buried next to George Azterodt, one of the executed Lincoln conspirators.

The trial and execution of Henry Wirz has been decried by most historians who have carefully evaluated the available evidence as a farcical affair. Robert E. Lee called the proceeding a "judicial lynching." Careful evaluation of the facts surrounding the case show that if this case had been tried in a proper manner, that being a fair trial with an impartial jury, he probably would have been acquitted, and certainly would not have been executed. The case of the United States Goverment was flawed by a lack of sufficient evidence, a questionable jurisdiction over the case, and well as outright tampering with evidence, and selective use of evidence to include only that which tend to incriminate, rather than exonerate Wirz.

Wirz was tried on two charges. The first charge accused him of "combining, confederating, and conspiring together with Jefferson Davis, Howell Cobb, John H., Richard B, and W. S. Winder, Isaiah H. White, R. Randolph Stevenson, and others to impair and injure the health and to destroy the livesof large numbers of Federal prisoners at Andersonville." Of this first charge, testimony was given to describe vividly the horrible conditions at the compound. Evidence of the alleged conspiracy, which could reasonably be expected to included telegraph messages, diary entries, and other written indications of the evil intent of these men, were not included in the testimony. Wirz was convicted of this charge.

Major impetus behind the conviction on this charge is just the sheer disbelief by the members of the court martial board that the deplorable conditions at the camp could have been as a result of anything other than an insidious plot by virtually the entire Confederate government. Further doubt is cast upon the conspiracy conviction by the fact that not one other person listed in the indictment was ever charged, tried, or convicted of the same offense. John Winder was dead, and Cobb had received a Presidential pardon, but noone else was judged for their participation in the alleged conspiracy.

The second charge against Wirz was composed of a total of 13 specifications, and dealt with numerous cases where Wirz was alleged to have ordered or personally committed acts of assault or murder on several different Union prisoners. Over 150 Union prisoners from the camp testified to having witnessed these events. As former prisoners of the camp, their testimony could hardly be considered non-biased. The specifications, and their respective flaws and lack of credibility are as follows:

Specification 1: That he shot a prisoner on July 8, 1864 with his own hand, the prisoner dying the following day. Despite having a pool of over 30,000 potential witnesses, the Court-Martial was unable to determine the name of the prisoner who was shot.

Specification 2: That Wirz maliciously stomped, kicked, and bruised a prisoner on September 20, 1864. Again despite having a pool of tens of thousands of potential witnesses, the Court-Martial was unable to determine the name of the prisoner who was assaulted.

Specification 3: That Wirz shot a prisoner with his own hand, on June 13, 1864. Again despite having a pool of tens of thousands of potential witnesses, the Court-Martial was unable to determine the name of the prisoner who was shot.

Specification 4: That Wirz shot a prisoner with his own hand on May 30, 1864. Again despite having a pool of tens of thousands of potential witnesses, the Court-Martial was unable to determine the name of the prisoner who was shot.

Specification 5: That Wirz placed a prisoner in stocks for punishment on August 20, 1864. Wirz was on sick leave during the month of August 1864, and was not even present at the time of the alleged event. Also the board was unable to determine the name of the prisoner. Furthermore, the use of stocks was an acceptable punishment in the U. S. Army at the time for commanders to employ against their own troops.

Specification 6: That Wirz caused a man to be placed in stocks, which resulted in his death on February 1, 1864. First, it is likely that there were no prisoners at Andersonville at this time, the first reported as having arrived on February 17, 1864. Second, Wirz was not even present at Andersonville until his arrival on April 12, 1864, nearly eight weeks after the alleged event.

Specification 7: That Wirz, on July 20, 1864, chained several prisoners together and made them carry around large iron balls fastened to their feet. The result was that one of the prisoners died. Again, none of the names of any of these several individuals were determined by the court.

Specification 8: That Wirz, on May 15, 1864, ordered a sentry to shoot a prisoner, which resulted in the prisoners death. This shooting was described as having occurred in broad daylight, in front of thousands of witnesses. Nevertheless, the board could not determine the name of the prisoner. Further, the prisoner shot had crossed the dead line, a line 18 feet from the prison walls that the men were forbidden to cross. The standing order was known to all prisoners, and everyone knew that crossing the line was subjecting oneself to being shot without warning. Dead lines were standard features in virtually all War Between the States prison camps, both in the North and South.

Specification 9: That Wirz, on July 1, 1864, ordered a sentry to shoot a prisoner, which resulted in the prisoner's death. Ditto, Specification 8.

Specification 10: That Wirz, on August 20, 1864, ordered a sentry to shoot a prisoner, which resulted in the prisoner's death. Ditto, Specification 8, but further, Wirz was not present at Andersonville on this date, as he was on sick leave.

Specification 11: That Wirz , on July 1, 1864, allowed bloodhounds to attack and wound a prisoner which resulted in his death six days later. Despite a pool of 30,000 potential witnesses, and the fact that the man survived for six days being cared for by his fellow prisoners, no name was determined by the board.

Specification 12: That Wirz, on July 27, 1864, ordered a sentry to shoot a prisoner, which resulted in the prisoner's death. Ditto, Specification 8.

Specification 13:That Wirz, on August 3, 1864, beat a prisoner with his pistol to the extent that the prisoner died the following day. Despite a pool of over 30,000 potential witnesses, the board could not determine the prisoners name. Further, Wirz would have had to have conducted this particularly difficult murder with only one hand, since he was physically incapable of raising his right hand high enough to strike anyone.

At the trial of Major Wirz, there were over 150 witnesses from among the former prisoners, men who had an obvious reason to detest Wirz, and anyone else associated with the camp. But the main prosecution witness was a man named Felix de la Baume, from whom a great deal of testimony was elicited. De la Baume must have been everywhere simultaneously in the compound, for little that Wirz did escaped his attention. He obviously had no trouble navigating quickly through the overcrowded prison yard to always be in position to observe Wirz commit every atrocity he was accused of. The testimony of de la Baume was believed without question.

But who was Felix de la Baume? A former Union soldier, de la Baume had been appointed to a position in the Department of the Interior even before the trial began. On November 21, 1865 he was identified as a deserter whose real name was Felix Oeser, formerly of the 7th New York Volunteers. Since Wirz had been hanged eleven days prior to his identification, he was quietly dismissed from his position and dropped from view.

Another witness upon whose testimony a great deal of weight was placed was Dr. Joseph Jones, a Confederate medical director who made an inspection tour of Andersonville. The report was filled with graphic descriptions of the appalling conditions of the camp. Upon learning of the existence of his report, he was ordered to testify at the trial. The prosecution then selectively gleaned the key tidbits from his report that tended to incriminate Wirz. Jones protested how his testimony was being used, but was not allowed to elaborate, explain, or mitigate any of his testimony in any manner that might have been favorable to Wirz. Nor was any evidence ever introduced that Wirz, or any of the men under his command had done anything to alleviate the terrible conditions at the camp, which they had indeed tried vigorously to do from the very beginning of the troubled camp.

Evidence was given as to the hateful vindictive nature of Wirz, but never were any of his efforts to help the prisoner brought to light. A possible witness who might have testified to Wirz's effort was Lieutenant General Richard Taylor. Taylor, on an inspection tour of Georgia in late 1864 passed through Andersonville by train. Wirz, with great determination, but probably little tact, confronted Taylor, the departmental commander on the train to complain at great length about the difficulties that he was having in caring for the prisoners. He complained of the lack of guards, and supplies. He specifically mentioned to Taylor that the prisoners were destitute of blankets, and that he did not have wagons to haul fuel for them to have fires. He presented copies of his many requisitions and appeals for help. Taylor said, "I know nothing of this Wirtz, who I then met for the first and only time, but he appeared earnest in his desire to mitigate the conditions of his prisoners. There can be little doubt that his execution was a 'sop' to the 'many-headed.'"

Wirz's participation in the destruction of the despicable group of prisoner called "The Raiders" was not mentioned during the trial. This group of prisoners was killing, beating, and robbing their fellow prisoners of food, clothes, and blankets. When the group was discovered by Wirz, he had the ringleaders brought to him, and he removed them from the compound. He wired his superiors for the authority to have the prisoners conduct trials for the men and conduct appropriate punishments. This authority was granted, trials were held, and six Union prisoners were hanged by their fellow prisoners. Many others were dispensed lesser punishments. If Wirz were truly the monster he was painted to be, dedicated to the deaths of his prisoners he would more likely have (1) allowed the Raider to continue to run amok, for they were killing far more prisoners than the Confederates were, and greatly degrading the ability of the other prisoners to survive, or (2) have merely shot the men down himself, or ordered it to be done, and dispensed with the niceties of the trial. But Wirz did neither. His handling of the Raider incident is well-documented in all of the contemporary accounts of events in the prison.

Nor was evidence introduced about the sickness and malnutrition which affected the Confederate guard force. The guard force, composed mainly of Georgia Reserve units, generally had half of its men on the sick list at any given time. This corresponds closely with the percentage of sick prisoners both in the prison hospital and within the compound. The shortage of medicines plagued the guard force as badly as it did the prisoners. This fact would have seriously impeded the government's contention of the massive conspiracy to kill Federal prisoners since the shortages resulting from the "plot" in this case were also decimating the Confederate guard force.

There is also some question as the validity of the Federal governments decision to claim that this case, as well as the cases of most of the Lincoln assassination conspiritors fell properly under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal. Recently, a mock trial was conducted at the University of Richmond Law School to argue the case of Dr. Samuel Mudd, in an effort to argue the validity of his conviction for aiding and abetting the escape of John Wilkes Booth from Washington. Mudd's case was argued by F. Lee Bailey and Candida Ewing Steel (a descendant of Dr. Mudd) before Judges Edward D. Re, Robinson O. Everett, and Walter T. Cox, III, all judges of considerable reputation. In the mock trial, all three judges elected to overturn the appeal of Dr. Mudd, with two judges citing a lack of proper jurisdiction. Their opinions contain legal precedents and constitutional opinions which may well have been valid in question the validity of Wirz's trial by military tribunal.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person may held to answer for a capital crime unless upon indictment by a Grand Jury. The only exception is in cases arising in the land and naval forces when in service or time of actual danger. Major Wirz was never a member of the United States military, only a member of an "enemy force." Thus he should not be considered for exception. At no time was Wirz ever heard or seen before, or indicted by a Grand Jury.

One other explanation which might have been considered by the government was the presence of martial law, both in Georgia (the scene of the crime), and in Washington (the scene of the trial). The case of Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) established that military jurisdiction over civilians is predicated only on cases of public danger or absolute necessity. The Milligan arose from a civilian who was tried by military tribunal in Indiana, where civilian courts were still in operation. His conviction was overturned, ruling that there was no necessity for Milligan to be judged by the military, since he could have been tried in the then-operating civilian courts.

Had the government of the U.S. elected to hold Wirz's trial in Georgia, their case would have been valid, since no U. S. civilian courts were operating in the state at the time. However, the removal of Wirz to Washington removed the necessity for judging Wirz in a military tribunal. Although under martial law since the early days of the war, Washington did have operating civilian courts, which would have been the proper arena to judge Major Wirz, who was not and had never been a member of the U. S. military.

The use of military tribunals is an accepted practice as set forth by contemporary documents such as A Treatise on Military Law by Benet (1862), and the use of military tribunals to rule occupied territories has been used in many countries occupied by U.S. military forces, i.e. Mexico, the former Confederate States, the Phillipines, Germany, and others. However, a different interpretation of these accepted rules may be called for when a case clearly within military jurisdiction is removed to a locale where such a jurisdiction is not appropriate.

It is clear to most historians that the case of Henry Wirz was at best "a rush to judgement." It has also been called a "Witch Hunt," with good reason. Despite being named as only one of many "conspirators," Henry Wirz was the only man ever called to answer for what happened at Andersonville. Wirz was probably only brought to trial because of the death of General John Winder, who would likely have been the target of the vengeful North had he survived. His trial featured a variety of things that would have sent appellate judges into fits of apoplexy: insufficient evidence, tampered evidence, disreputable witnesses, questionable legal jurisdiction, and period from the end of trial to the hanging of less than three weeks. The trial of Wirz was probably not so much a search for justice as a search for a scapegoat to salve the American public that had been whipped to a frenzy by irresponsible jounalists writing about the "atrocities" which occurred at the camp.

Henry Wirz would not be properly painted as a saint. His contemporaries often described his as irascible, pertually angry, and exceptionally profane. His personality, which became well-known to the men in his charge, was likely induced by the intense pain caused by his unhealed wound and continued ill health. But nothing about him justified hanging him, and him alone, among all of the men who administered Northern and Southern prison camps. The victor not only writes the history, but gets to judge those who commit "atrocities."

There is no indication that commander of Camp Douglas, Illinois was called to account for why 12% of his prison population died in one month in February of 1863. The Union jailers who robbed their prisoners of their blankets were never recommended for trial. The lack of firewood at Point Lookout and Elmira, New York was never looked into. The boast by the surgeon at Elmira that he "had killed more Rebels than any soldier at the front" was never investigated. None of the Union guards or commanders were ever called to account for the many Southerners who were shot while crossing the "dead line" in their camps in the North. In response to press reports of the conditions at Andersonville, the commander of Rock Island Barracks ordered the prisoner's rations cut, and forbade them to utilize the barracks buildings, forcing them to sleep outside in makeshift shelters exposed to an Illinois winter. As a result of his order, 1,922 out of 2,484 of his prisoners, died of starvation and exposure. The death rate of the Southern prisoners was 77.4 percent. (The death rate at Andersonville was 24 percent.) There is no indication that he was even so much as reprimanded for his actions by Union authorities.

While Andersonville has been called "a stain on the honor of the Confederacy," It should more properly be considered a stain on the entire United States. The decisions of the United States to halt the prisoner of war exchanges unfortunately coincided with the beginning of the collapse of the tattered Southern railway net. The decision of Grant to force the thousands of mouths to feed on the Confederacy did have a telling effect on the lives of many Union prisoners. Nowhere is the legacy of that decision more visible than in the Andersonville National Cemetery where over 13,000 white marble markers testify to the brutal pragmatism of his decision.

Henry Wirz was killed in what General Robert E. Lee described as, "a judicial murder." While credible evidence existed at the time, and still exists today that he did everything in his power to care for the men in his charge, and the evidence linking him to the so called atrocities is flimsy at best, he alone was held to account for the shortcomings of the entire Confederacy in meeting the logistical challenge of caring for the prisoners in his charge. Convicted in a hasty and flagrantly unfair trial, he was executed in a brutally quick execution with no chance to have an appeal heard or to mount a credible defense.

The continual judging of Confederate heroes by today's standards nowhere leaves foes of the South more vulnerable than in the case of this executed officer. For if his trial had been heard in anything approaching a fair setting he certainly would not have met his end at the end of a hangman's noose, and possible would never have even been punished given the weakness of the government's case.

Bibliography:

Civil War Prisons & Escapes, by Robert Denney, Sterling Publishing, New York
This Was Andersonville, Edited by Roy Meredith, Bonanza Books, New York
The History of Andersonville Prison, by Ovid L. Futch, University of Florida Press
Destruction and Reconstruction, by General Richard Taylor, Bantam Books, New York
United States Special Court of Military Appeal, Samuel A. Mudd v. United States, University of Richmond Law School, Richmond, Virginia

The Mudd Judgement provides interesting food for thought concerning the legality of Edwin Stanton's numerous tribunals held after the war for the Lincoln conspirators and many others across the South.